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These real-world cases are remarkable precedents for a wide-ranging body of fictional works that take as their starting point the figure of the Nazi disguised as a Jew.
He is a preposterous figure, for he seems brazenly to undermine the differences between Nazi perpetrators and Jewish victims specifically, and the blurring of categories of perpetrator and victim more broadly. Yet by bridging the identity of perpetrator and victim, and by linking the society which carried out the genocide with post-war societies that are committed to it never happening again, the figure serves as both a spark and a conduit for concerns about the legacy of the Holocaust in contemporary society. Furthermore, the revelation that an ordinary Jewish citizen was once a perpetrator and is now indistinguishable from others, suggests that anyone might be exposed as a perpetrator. Read metaphorically, this figure personifies the fear that citizens who are held to be 'ordinary', who are integrated in and contribute to society and who show no sign of being capable of atrocity, are indeed capable of extreme violence, and that the society into which they fit so seamlessly may also be complicit or capable of complicity or even atrocity.
The character of the Nazi masquerading as Jewish becomes especially arresting and provocative when its blurring of roles between perpetrator and victim leads to the painful topic of Jewish complicity and when it is Israeli justice and society that are Saul Greenberg, are being pursued by Nazis, but are finally exposed by the private detective as a Nazi couple being followed by Mossad. In the same year, the pilot movie of Cagney and Lacey has a Nazi living in New York as a Hassidic Jew, who commits murder to keep his identity safe. The detective Cagney drily sums up the case once she and her partner have caught the murderer: 'Ironic isn't it, a Nazi killing to retain his identity as a Jew'. 8 The role of the Nazi masquerading as Jewish in these texts extends beyond an unexpected plot twist or the suspense of being exposed. At the heart of these texts, and in keeping with the theme of crime, is an exploration of themes of culpability and justice in various forms. These imagined disguise stories articulate disquiet about perpetrators of extreme crimes evading justice and about the identity of a perpetrator who is indistinguishable from his victims. Furthermore, the specifically Jewish disguise functions to unsettle essentializing distinctions between perpetrator and victim, which in turn complicate our understanding of appropriate justice. A concern with justice is central to the corpus, even when the figure of the disguised Nazi is not set within the where he is determined to do better than 'Eichy the Clerk' (167), Dorff willingly admits to his crimes and uses his position to challenge notions of justice and responsibility.
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Only in the last pages of the novel does it emerge that Dorff is in fact Goldman pretending to be Dorff-disguised-as-Goldman, precisely so that he can speak the truth as he sees it at a major trial. Goldman's plan has involved elaborate planning: he burns a scar into his left underarm, so that it appears that he has removed the blood type that SS members had tattooed onto them; he forges records so that X-rays of his collar-bone and knee cap are substituted for Dorff's; and he uses bribery and forgery to lay a trail of records that implicate him as the SS Colonel (97, 107, 136, 209).
The novel is suffused with the view that injustice needs to be challenged in the service of truth. In interview, Shaw described himself as having an 'iconoclastic sense of justice', a description that equally applies to his character, Goldman, for whom no the Nazis, insisting that 'Gentiles would have been no different' and pointing to the 'great system' the Nazis had: they combined torture ('a thousand deaths') and murder when they met with resistance with deceit, keeping the Jews' fate from them during deportation (190, 192 attention and press coverage. 31 'Dorff''s fictional trial thus overlaps with that of the twenty-two middle and lower ranking Auschwitz functionaries. The Auschwitz trial was similar to the Eichmann trial in that its significance too was intended by its initiators to be more than the trials of the specific defendants; it was designed 'to put the whole system of mass extermination on trial'. 32 It also differed for this reason, for the accused were men who 'under "normal" conditions were unlikely to have committed the crimes attributed to them': after 1945 most of them had returned to ordinary middle class lives and none had criminal records. 33 The trial therefore had the potential to lead to precisely the greater understanding of genocidal criminality that Arendt had hoped for from the Eichmann trial. In some ways it was able to do this, not least through its very conception, since defendants were selected to reflect the range of roles across Auschwitz, including Birkenau and Monowitz. The trial drew on and stimulated expert opinion and detailed historical research which extended the understanding of how industrial scale murder had occurred. The defendants' exculpatory narratives offered considerable insight into how ordinary men were mobilized within the system. Their narratives point to the willingness to obey orders, and the importance of orders for conferring apparent legitimacy on acts of collective violence. Similarly, the defendants frequently claimed to have been distant from the 'real' evil and even ignorant of it, a defense they sought to justify by referring to the distinct tasks they performed in a process of murder that depended on a division of labor. Such a division facilitated an individual's involvement in violence, precisely because individuals could distance themselves from the outcome of the task and from bearing responsibility for it. 34 The separation of tasks was then later used as a defense against culpability.
It is in part inevitable, for in the nature of a criminal trial, that such wider insights into the nature of collective violence were overshadowed in favor of determining the specific truth or otherwise of those defense narratives in individual cases. However, even when Kurt Hinrichsen, an expert witness, challenged the ubiquitous exculpatory narratives, that functionaries had to obey criminal orders, pointing out that the defense was a retrospective justification, the defense continued to be accepted as viable. Indeed, it was a defense that continued to be considered viable in other trials. 35 The sustained validity of such defenses was reinforced by the West German focus on malicious intent and excessive violence in determining whether an individual was guilty of murder, categories which could not be easily mapped onto systematized murder. How far, then, the trial contributed to the recognition that a 'new criminal' needed to be posited, is debatable. Certainly, the widespread reporting of routine cruelty may have contributed to this, and the notion of collective guilt was most frequently mentioned by German newspapers in relation to the Auschwitz trial. 36 But the Attorney General of Hessen, Fritz Bauer, who along with Hermann Langbein had instigated the trial, thought the trial a failure in this regard. In his view, the trial consolidated the view that most Germans had merely followed orders and that the Holocaust was perpetrated by a monstrous few. Indeed, it is precisely because he is enjoying his performance so much that the old woman in the audience feels compelled to expose his disguise. The novel does, therefore, self-consciously reflect upon the importance of performance in the court setting. Arendt too is aware of this, but her discussion of performance focusses on the performativity of justice: the court house, its lay-out and its rituals are those of a theatre, the usher's shout like the rising curtain, Ben-Gurion as the stage manager, and the prosecutor enjoying the limelight. 38 The novel, in contrast, extends the drama of the court to include the defendant's own act, one that he has spent years rehearsing and planning. Thus the novel, and more obviously, Shaw's play, offer a late corrective to Arendt's remark that Eichmann's trial 'never became a play'. 39 We learn only retrospectively, following the old woman's trial revelation, that Goldman's 'Dorff' act has been long in the making and involves laying clues to give credence to the pretense that he is Dorff masquerading as Goldman. Goldman's performance bombastically reinforces an image of the Nazi perpetrator as monstrous. The fact that Goldman seems, to a degree, to have taken on the identity of Dorff, raises the question of how far performing a role can develop its own momentum and bring with it a willingness to behave that attaches to the role.
However, this question is not explored other than in terms of Goldman's individual pathology. One of the final ironies of the novel is the fact that Goldman was the real Dorff's cousin: the men's mothers were Jewish sisters, but in Dorff's case, the mother was forgotten and he and his father both became enthusiastic Nazis (164). According to the old woman who confirms Goldman's identity, he owes his survival to Dorff, who brought his cousin food in the camp. This put Goldman in the position of a 'Jewish prominent', though not, according to the woman, one of the 'cruellest Jews' (214), for he further distributes the food. Nevertheless, in distributing the food he 'made judgements' and never gave food to the Muselmänner. This revelation leads to a renewed focus on Goldman, his personal identity crisis and feelings of guilt. It exposes the way in which Goldman has been acting out the guilt of being a victim, yet with power over the fate of other prisoners, thereby assuming the role of the 'German'. Even as he appears to suffer a breakdown at the end, shifting in and out of being Goldman and Dorff, his performance becomes 'grand' and he strips naked, assuming the role of Christ, seeking crucifixion. The language of Christian sacrifice might be understood as Goldman's somewhat depraved attempt to repent on his own behalf or on his cousin Dorff's. 40 Yet the language of redemption is out of place in either case and Goldman's hyperbolic utterances serve only to emphasize its inadequacy.
Goldman's exaggerated performance, the fact that he 'over-simplified' and 'acted Dorff grand' (217), is also an apt verdict on the novel. It is governed by Goldman's persona, either as himself, which is just as over-dimensional as his enactment of the Nazi, or as 'Dorff'. Goldman's dramatic pull circumscribes the novel's own impact, and the interjections of others are too brief and unbalanced to offer nuance.
The novel, through the device of a later restaging of a trial that bears strong parallels with Eichmann's, and with a protagonist who self-consciously aims to do better than and their punishment that make him 'cold with rage' (164). In his view, whereas the Russians and East Europeans are committed to justice, because they too were victims of atrocities, the Western Allies prefer to forget and the British are depicted as being especially lenient to Nazis. Sinclair witnesses how three mass murderers win their appeal against their sentence in 1949, claiming that they acted under duress and looking so ordinary that it is difficult to imagine them as mass murderers. It is upon their release that 'there and then the assassin was born in my soul' (164), as he writes in his diary.
Through the eyes of Shomron, from whose perspective events are told and who discovers and reads Sinclair's diary, Sinclair's murderous revenge is understandable.
Indeed, in contrast to the supercilious British official who dismisses the Old Testament eye for an eye 'stuff' as primitive, and who suggests that 'we have to be generous enough to forgive' (158), Sinclair's attempt to pursue justice elicits a certain empathy in Shomron. However, the type of extra-judicial justice Sinclair's murder represents is challenged in four different ways in the novel. First, and unsurprisingly, the police authorities view Sinclair's murder as a crime for which he should stand trial. The police 20 should determine facts and motivation, but an independent trial remains the proper process for ensuring justice is done. Secondly, and re-enforcing the importance of a trial, rather than private revenge, Benamir's son Yuval is devastated that his father had no opportunity to contest the accusation that he was Kampfmann and prove his innocence. What for Sinclair is a form of justice creates a new injustice that extends to Benamir's family, who are also deprived of a fair trial and will be 'destroyed by rumor' (70). Thirdly, the figure of the avenging Sinclair is represented as rigid and lacking a humane ability for pragmatic compromise or for recognizing how social or historical factors influence the process of justice. It is refreshing to have a survivor who is not sentimentalized or idealized by virtue of his suffering: Sinclair is 'brittle' (167) and alienating, diminished by his trauma. He is obsessed with vengeance and is 'no Simon
Wiesenthal intent on bringing war criminals to justice' (ibid). In fact, his mission has assumed messianic intent: over and above killing Kampfmann for revenge, he wants to kill him in order to put the State of Israel on trial.
In conversation with psychiatrists, Sinclair denies that his motive was revenge and insists that he was only concerned to achieve justice; had he found Kampfmann Israelis from what they regarded as the shameful response of Europe's Jews to their destruction', 46 a shame that was also reflected in the minimal media attention paid to the trials: 'A kapo trial was a filthy and embarrassing story'. 47 This wider ideological and affective context marked the law itself, which Orna Ben-Naftali and Yogev Tuval describe as 'unique for the distinction that it does not draw between the Nazis and their collaborators' and because it does not 'differentiate explicitly between various forms and degrees of collaboration'. 48 Indeed, the law did not define what a 'collaborator'
was. 49 As a result, the law reinforced a view of the Holocaust that ignored its complexity and the reality of those who were subjected to genocidal policies: 'the experience of ordinary people was overshadowed by a culturally constructed dichotomy between "slaughtered lamb" and "heroes"'.
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Interestingly, however, and in a manner that goes some way to temper Zertal's description of the trials as 'purges', the sentences delivered by the trial judges were often relatively lenient compared to the language with which the defendants' behavior was described. Nevertheless, the trials left a legacy that simplified the question of of an overall argument, nor are they subject to the need to pass a judgement. On the contrary, the multiple perspectives are an attempt to put right the 'missed opportunities' of the kapo and the Eichmann trials to develop a complex discourse around questions of complicity and culpability. 58 Further, while through the figure of Shomron the novel advocates the need for trials to uphold the rule of law, it casts doubt on the notion that trials are the place where the development of complex discourse may take place. It does so in a number of ways: by refusing to structure the novel around the process of a trial itself; by showing the failure of historical trials, such as the Nuremberg trials which failed to prosecute most of those who were involved in the genocide and prematurely acquitted those it did sentence; by suggesting that trials are instrumentalized in the service of aims, ideological or pragmatic, that are not centrally concerned with justice;
and by showing that the legacy of trials is to simplify complex issues and reinforce dichotomies.
Concluding Remarks
Litvinoff's doubts about trials being the adequate arena for resolving complex issues of The Gray Zone', was instrumental in creating a space for discussing collaboration and victimhood without denying victimhood. 59 In it, Levi writes about the impossibility of dividing the world of the concentration camp into good and evil.
Indeed, the destruction of comprehensible boundaries was an immediate lesson on 26 arrival in the camp: 'the enemy was all around but also inside, the "we" lost its limits,
[…] one could not discern a single frontier but rather many confused, perhaps innumerable frontiers, which stretched between each of us.' 60 Levi's gray zone was the space in which a perverse state of extreme coercion resulted in victims becoming kapos and instruments of the authorities in order to survive. It was a space so morally complicated that it becomes almost impossible to judge those within it; certainly, Levi knows 'of no human tribunal to which one could delegate the judgement.'
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The emotional complexity and anguish inherent to the issue of Jewish cooperation, and the shortcomings of the kapo trials in addressing the 'totality of the moral collapse the Nazis caused' as Arendt saw it, continue to be relevant. The potency of these discussions is perhaps reflected in the fact that there was no Hebrew edition of Litvinoff's novel. 62 It is without a doubt reflected in current scholarship in the inability been heard by a Jewish religious court, for they were better able to respond to 'the gray zone'. In contrast, in a brief final paragraph of dissent, Tuerkheimer points to the fact that some kapos did act with a brutality beyond what was required and that even in the camps they were able to make choices at this level. Thus they should not be exonerated, but their situations should be treated as a mitigating factor. 63 What in their different ways both Bazyler and Tuerkheimer seem both to be arguing for is a system of justice that allows for greater complexity, and this is very much in keeping with the purpose of Litvinoff's novel.
The figure of the Nazi disguised as a Jew is provocative, for it destabilizes the notion of a perpetrator identity and personifies, sometimes in grotesque form, the anxiety that perpetrators are much like those around them. The figure is a potent literary tool for exploring justice and trials, for by unsettling stable categories, it also raises broader questions about both the role of trials in consolidating identity and social complicity. These are questions that continue to be relevant in many national contexts.
The figure has some historical precedents, but is a particularly potent figure in fiction.
Fiction belongs to the realm of play, masquerade and fantasy, and this figure has been variously used as a means for imagining contradictions, difficult paradoxes and 27 unresolved emotions without being in the service of an argument or requiring definitive judgements. Both The Man in the Glass Booth and Falls the Shadow remain unresolved and do not offer solutions to the questions they raise. By so doing they challenge us to be cognizant of the ambivalent emotions and moral ambiguity that influence the practice of justice.
Notes
